A high-street bank can spend decades ignoring digital assets altogether and still find itself starring in a crypto scam.
With International Fraud Awareness Week (15-21 November) under way, modern fraud looks like a round trip: victims wire funds into criminal-controlled wallets, and fraudsters eventually cash those proceeds into sterling, running the dirty money through ordinary bank accounts.
A bank’s own ledger usually captures only the opening chapter. It tracks the domestic payment leaving the account and stops there, so the conversion into crypto and the shuffling between wallets happen entirely out of its sight. Regulators still expect banks that service crypto businesses to keep up thorough due diligence and anti-money-laundering checks, whether or not they offer crypto themselves.
Worse still, the clean-up bill is already landing on banks. Under reimbursement rules that took effect on 7 October 2024, victims of authorised push payment (APP) fraud can recover up to £85,000 on qualifying transfers. The sending and receiving banks then split the total evenly.
Why The Bank’s Record Stops Where The Wallet Begins
Crypto has a reputation for disappearing without a trace, but on most major blockchains every transfer stays on open view for good.
Specialist analysts can map clusters of wallets and connect them to known exchanges, but putting a name to the human behind an address is the tricky step. That usually depends on an exchange holding identity records, and getting them handed over or the funds frozen takes cooperation from compliance teams and often a court.
Complaints add another layer of oversight. The Financial Ombudsman Service can’t claw back crypto from a blockchain, and some withdrawals and later transfers fall beyond its remit. It can still look at how a bank handled the original payment and whether it should have flagged anything odd. The loss may leave the bank’s books while the scrutiny stays.
We asked experts why banks are exposed to crypto fraud even when they offer no crypto services, how traceable stolen crypto is in practice and who should carry the cost when the money has already left the bank. Here’s what they said.
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Our Experts
- Robert Eastick, Director and Crypto Investigator, iSanctuary
- Kyle Sonlin, President, Global Settlement Network
- Rodion Sorokin, Co-Founder and CTO, The Capital Index
- Safi Ghauri, Managing Partner, Esquare Legal
Robert Eastick, Director and Crypto Investigator, iSanctuary

“Despite many people believing that blockchain transactions are untraceable, they provide a permanent record of activity. However, interpreting that information requires specialist knowledge. Investigators will need to examine transaction patterns, follow the movement of assets between wallets and identify potential connections with exchanges, services and other entities. This intelligence can then be considered alongside conventional financial records, open-source intelligence and other evidence to help establish who may be involved.
“Importantly, tracing assets does not automatically mean they can be recovered. Cryptocurrency may have passed through multiple wallets, been swapped for other assets, or end up in exchanges in other jurisdictions. Even where assets are identified, freezing and returning them can require appropriate legal grounds, court orders or cooperation from exchanges, law enforcement and other relevant parties.”
Kyle Sonlin, President, Global Settlement Network

“A bank doesn’t need to offer crypto services to finance the first leg of a crypto scam or receive the proceeds at the other end, because its customers and payment connections already create that exposure. I think the dangerous assumption is that a payment to a legitimate exchange tells you enough about the transaction’s purpose, when it may simply be the first step in a fraud that continues through a customer’s own wallet. Public blockchains can give investigators a persistent record of where funds moved, which Europol has highlighted as an advantage over cash, but seeing an address is different from identifying its controller or securing the authority to freeze their assets. The practical challenge is connecting bank records, exchange identity checks and blockchain activity quickly enough to give recovery a chance.
“On who pays, I’d start with the applicable reimbursement rules, then examine what each institution knew and whether it had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. The UK framework makes an important distinction: qualifying domestic bank transfers can fall within mandatory APP reimbursement, while crypto transfers and payments into accounts the customer controls fall outside those specific rules, although the Financial Ombudsman can still examine complaints about those journeys. That means ‘the money left our bank’ is an inadequate explanation on its own, just as the involvement of crypto does not automatically establish bank liability.
“My view is that firms should bear responsibility where failures in their controls contributed to the loss, and victims should have a clear route to redress without having to reconstruct the entire laundering chain themselves; otherwise, fragmented payment infrastructure leaves the person with the least visibility carrying the greatest burden.”
Rodion Sorokin, Co-Founder and CTO, The Capital Index

“Banks are exposed because the scam starts in their app, even if it ends on a blockchain. Often the victim first sends money to an exchange account in their own name, so the bank sees a routine ‘me-to-me’ transfer; the crypto is then forwarded to a criminal’s wallet, and the proceeds can come back into another bank account later. In the UK, me-to-me payments fall outside the APP reimbursement rules, which returned 88% of money lost to APP scams in their first year, so crypto scam victims are often the ones left uncovered.
“Stolen crypto is far more traceable than people think, because every transfer sits on a public ledger. The hard part is getting it back: funds hop through mixers, cross-chain bridges and exchanges in jurisdictions that don’t cooperate, and only assets sitting in freezable stablecoins or at compliant exchanges can be stopped quickly. Chainalysis estimates crypto scams generated more than $17 billion in losses in 2025.
“On cost, share it along the chain: banks when they ignored clear warning signs, exchanges when they onboarded or cashed out mule accounts, and platforms when the scam ran through their ads.”
Safi Ghauri, Managing Partner, Esquare Legal

“The current liability model affects banks because almost every scam starts with a bank transfer: the bank is the last regulated checkpoint before fiat becomes a token. In the UK, losses to crypto exchanges increased more than two-and-a-half times between 2023 and 2025.
“Stolen crypto is easy to trace and extremely hard to recover. Analytics firms can follow funds across hops within hours, but in practice you only get money back if a stablecoin issuer freezes it or it lands at a licensed exchange that cooperates. Once funds pass through a mixer, a bridge or an offshore OTC desk, all you have is a map.
“On cost, the UK’s 50:50 split between sending and receiving banks is progress, but it ignores the platform where the scam started and the exchange that converted the funds. Liability should follow whoever could have stopped the loss.”
